All providers of payment terminals and a certain number of third-party providers are capable of providing anti-skimming solutions of varying effectiveness. A European test team (European ATM Security Team) has set up and maintains a data base of anti-skimming solutions and their functions. However, at present there is no certification or independent evaluation of these solutions and certain solutions are more efficient than others.
Many solutions have thus been proposed to overcome these problems of security posed by payment terminals when they are installed in unreliable environments. These solutions include the modification of the terminal, for example by modifying the shape of the terminal. This modification of shape takes the form of the addition of specific volumes which prevent a fraudulent bank-data-reading device from being attached or glued to the payment terminal.
However, the efficiency of this solution is quite relative. Indeed, the fabrication of fraudulent bank-data-reading devices by the manufacturers of these devices is generally a cottage industry and these manufacturers are capable of adapting to the specific constraints of terminals to which the devices must be adapted. It is therefore very simple, for the manufacturers of fraudulent bank-data-reading devices to modify the shape of their devices as a function of the payment terminals.
Another approach which has been proposed consists in providing the terminal with pressure sensors at determined places of the terminal. These pressure sensors are supposed to sense the joining on of a fraudulent bank data reading device.
Here too, the adaptability displayed by the manufacturers of fraudulent devices means that the total reliability of this solution cannot be ensured.
In another solution, the payment terminal is provided with a scrambling device which disturbs the transmission of data sent from any fraudulent device. Another solution is that of providing the keypad with a specific concealment ensuring that the confidential code entered by the bank card reader cannot be recorded when keyed in by a camera hidden beside or in the payment terminal.
The patent FR2857113 which relates to the field of the present disclosure describes a secured case containing a keypad used to introduce confidential data such as a personal identification number intended in particular for an electronic payment system secured in the aspects of mechanical, electronic and electromagnetic emission. It has a capacitive matrix touch screen on the one hand connected by connection wires to a printed circuit board bearing the associated controller, a security module as well as electronic circuitry sensitive to variations in the capacitance of the system. On the other hand, it is sandwiched between two glass plates, namely a front or protection glass plate and a rear or supporting glass plate. The problem with the solution provided by the patent FR2857113 is firstly that it does not apply to the positioning of the mechanical keypad (the keypad protected in the patent FR2857113 is a numerical keypad displayed on a touch screen). Secondly, the system of FR2857113 cannot resolve the problems arising out of the installation of a system at the slot of the payment terminal. Finally, the solution proposed by the patent FR2857113 is costly and complex to implement.
To date, there is no solution that totally resolves this problem for a cost deemed to be reasonable. Now, it is important to provide payment terminals in which the users can place trust, namely terminals that are not in any way too costly to produce.